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"New York is a city which has everything. It has produced 
historic achievements in many fields of human endeavor, from financial 
wizardry to artistic innovation. So I am all the more full of 
admiration for the stamina with which people like you stand up to 
speeches on foreign policy at this time of the year. 
"It disproves the assertion of a New York journalist that 'the 
true New Yorker does not really seek information about the outside 
world. He feels that anything that is not in New York is not likely 
to be interesting. r 
"I shall try to be interesting today. But it is not something 
that all British Foreign Secretaries have achieved. Apoet wrote the 
following of one of my predecessors: 
'Last night I tossed and turned in bed, 
But could not sleep at length I said, 
I'll think of Viscount Castlereagh 
And of Speeches -- that's the way.' 
"I hope that I shall give you food for thought today but not 
provide you with the midday equivalent of, a nightcap. 
"In a speech in London just 30 years ago, General Eisenhower, 
then Allied Commander in Europe, called for unity among the European 
11ations~ 'It would be difficult indeed,' he said, 'to overstate the 
benefits, in these years of stress and tension, that would accrue to 
NATO if the free nations of Europe were truly a unit.' 
"A great deal has happened since then. There is no United 
States of Europe. But there is a European Community of Ten Nations, 
which soon should be increased to Twelve. Great strides have been 
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made in integrating the economies of its members. There has also 
been progress, which I shall describe, towards the development of a 
common foreign policy. 
"Indeed, I have chosen to speak about Europe today because 
this Community of Ten nowadays provides increasingly the context in 
which Britain frames its domestic and its foreign policies. As it 
happens, Britain currently occupies the Presidency of the Community. 
So it is particularly appropriate for the British Foreign Secretary 
to talk to an American audience about Europe's foreign policy: how 
·- .. 
it has developed up to now, how it may grow in the future and how I 
believe it can contribute to the overall strength of the Western world. 
"Let me say at the outset that Britain's membership of the 
European Community does not conflict with but contributes to a new 
chapter in our historic friendship and partnership with the United 
States. Ours is a tried and tested friendship based on a shared 
history and a common heritage, a friendship which, again in General 
Eisenhower's words, 'was never recorded on legal parchment but in 
the hearts of our two peoples.' The affection shown by so many 
Americans for the Prince and Princess of Wales at the time of their 
wedding shows that these bonds of sentiment and friendship remain 
strong. 
"But the most important element in the great Anglo-American 
fri~ndship is our shared belief in democracy, individual liberty and 
the rule of lawo These are precisely the principles on which the 
European Community rests. Britain's active membership of the Commu-
nity of ten nations, shortly we hope to be joined by two newly 
democratic states, Spain and Portugal, will strengthen rather than 
dilute our ties with the United Stateso 
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"It took the First World War to put an end to the period when 
the United States had tried to stand aloof from Europe. Even then, 
American involvement in European affairs was reluctant and not 
entirely happy for either side. Some European leaders found 
President Wilson's high-minded style oppressiveo The French leader 
Clemenceau grumbled: 'Mr. Wilson bores me with his 14 points; the 
Lord God has only 10.' Then as the peace talks dragged on, Clemenceau 
asked: 'How can I talk to a fellow who thinks himself the first man 
in 2,000 years to know anything about peace on earth?' But in any 
case this first American dip into European waters was soon followed 
by another period of deliberate isolation. 
"The Second World War and its aftermath changed all that, this 
time permanently. America's military intervention made it possible 
to restore the freedom of Western Europe and at the time every Euro-
pean knew that this was soo In the first years of peace, the Marshall 
Plan was one of the most imaginative and successful expressions of 
generosity and self-interest that the world has ever known. America 
realized that isolation was no longer an option. From that day, like 
it or not, you have had to have a global foreign policyo 
"De Tocqueville was talking of Americans as individuals when 
he said that 'if an American were to confine his activity to his own 
affairs he would be robbed of half of his existence.' But his remark 
has become equally true of America's foreign policy to the great 
benefit of Europe and the world. 
"Your foreign policy has been based on close identification 
with the peoples and objectives of the Western democracies. The 
foreign policies of the Europeans and of America are designed to 
/defend ••• 
- 5 -
defend our common way of life. Your aims and ours are identical in 
this respect. Their identity is symbolized by the North Atlantic 
Treaty, which established the Alliance which had kept the peace in 
Europe for over three decades. 
"If the United States waited for nearly two centuries before 
adopting an active foreign policy, it is small wonder that the 
European Community took two decades, from its first steps towards 
economic unity, before embarking on the difficult waters of foreign 
policy coordination. Our problems of course were very different 
from yours. No-one in Western Europe had ever thought of isolation 
as a possibility. The individual states of Europe each had a long 
tradition of active foreign policy. It had expressed itself in a 
shifting pattern of alliances. It had been reflected in bitter 
rivalry in every corner of the world -- even including, once upon a 
time, here in North America. 
"These wounds of course have long been healed. To prove it 
once again, Britain will make the magnanimous gesture of sending a 
Cabinet Minister -- the Lord Chancellor -- to vepresent us at the 
anniversary celebrations next month of the Battle of Yorktown. 
"The British were defeated in 1781 by an unholy alliance of 
the Americans and the French. As the British soldiers withdrew from 
Yorktown with their regimental band playing -- so it is said -- 'The 
world turned upside down.' They were not to know that 200 years 
later those same three nations would be joined not in battle but, 
with others in a powerful alliance to preserve peace and freedom. 
But nor were they to know that before this happened the bankrupcy of 
these individual foreign policies was demonstrated by the shattering 
experience of two world wars, which left our continent weak~ 
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impoverished and divided by that tragic rift which Winston Churchill 
christened the Iron Curtain. 
"Yet it was one thing to see, in the late 40s, that the old 
system was bankrupt. It was another to move forward to a better one. 
"So it is no mean achievement on the part of Europe that, when 
I spoke yesterday in the United Nations General Assembly, I was able 
to do so in the name not of Britain alone but of the members of the 
European Community. The speech, in itself, may not have been remark-
able. You know the definition of a camel: 'a horse designed by a 
committee.' But I think it made good sense and was received as a 
balanced and coherent approach to the problems of the world today. 
"Before I talk about the coordination of foreign policy in the 
Community, let me say something about the institution itself. The 
Community is a group of free and democratic states committed to pur-
suing an even greater degree of unity through common economic rules 
and policies. We do not pretend that this will be easy. Reconciling 
strongly held national interests never is. Nor is ·sharing out scarce 
resources, as the occasional quarrel between Federal and State 
authorities on this side of the Atlantic shows. I therefore fear 
that you will continue to hear of squabbles about money, fish, sheep-
meat, turkeys and the like. 
"But this does not mean that the Community is falling apart. 
Far from it: it is a sign that the Community is in business, facing 
and not ducking the issues. I believe it can and will emerge 
strengthened as a result of the negotiations now in progress, and 
that it can and will continue to promote the economic strength of 
its members. And I am quite clear that it is in Western interests 
that it should. 
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"Let me turn now the cooperation of the Ten in foreign policyo 
Because the Community is a customs union, it had from the beginning 
to adopt common external policies in many areas, of trade and 
economic relations. But there was no Treaty obligation to consult 
on foreign policy as such. 
"It was some years before the interaction of external economic · 
policy and foreign policy proper led the members to establish the 
system which bears the somewhat colorless title of European Political 
Cooperation. 
"So political cooperation grew naturally out of economic in-
tegration. And over the years the realization has grown that economic 
policy and foreign policy are Siamese twins. In politics, as in 
economics, the countries that make up Western Europe are too small 
today to operate successfully on their own. They have to find a 
unified response to modern problems if they are to control their own 
destinies. 
"The political si~e has in fact moved faster in recent years 
than the economic, catching up, you might say, with the economic 
integration registered in the early period. But it would be quite 
wrong to suppose that the Community's economic problems can be com-
pensated for by means of a more active foreign policy. Progress is 
needed on both fronts if the Community is to realize its potential. 
"What, then, has been achieved in our political cooperation? 
Let me take three exampleso 
"First is that complex process known as the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE for short). Throughout the 
years of detailed and exacting negotiations, from the preparatory 
conference in Helsinki in the early 70s right through to the review 
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meetings still waiting to be concluded in Madrid, the members of 
the Community have managed to act closely in unison. There may be 
some in this room who know how greatly this has strengthened the 
overall Western position, and how it contributed in particular to the 
humanitarian sections of the Helsinki Final Act. At times it has 
even been the Ten, rather than the 15 members of NATO, who have given 
a lead. 
"A second, and I know more controversial, area of European 
activity is the Middle East. Critics of the European efforts in this 
field sometimes forget that the Venice Declaration of June 1980 was 
issued at a time when the Camp David· process was for various reasons 
in doldrums and likely to remain so for some time. In the consequent 
political vacuum, frustration was growing. Even the most moderate 
Arab leaders were demanding to know what the West as a whole was 
doing to promote the generally accepted goal of a just and lasting 
settlement. The United States, for understandable reasons, was un-
able at the time to give a satisfactory answer. At Venice the 
European Community, whose economic interests of course are even more 
directly involved in the region than are those of the United States, 
suggested some principles for progress. We believe they are balanced 
and realistic. They included, of course, Israel's security. But 
they also covered the Palestinian problem with an emphasis different 
from that of Camp David. 
"At Venice the Ten drew attention to the right of the 
Palestinian people to determine their own future and suggested that 
the Palestinian Liberation Organization must be associated with any 
peace efforts. We believed, then, and are even more convinced today, 
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that a proper appreciation of the Palestinian aspect is essential if 
a lasting solution is to be found, and if the historic progress 
initiated at Camp David on the Egypt-Israel front is to be extended 
to the West Bank. We did not see then, and we do not see now, that 
the two balancing principles on which the European approach is based 
security for Israel and self-determination for the Palestinians 
can be regarded as anything but even-handed and irrefutable. 
"My third example is a more recent initiative. It will soon 
be two years since the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, exposing to 
the world the hollowness of Soviet claims to champion peace and self-
determination. We must not let Afghanistan become, like Ethiopia in· 
the 1930s, the victim of aggression on the part of one government and 
indifference on the part of the rest. We must continue to work hard 
for a Soviet withdrawal, not only so that Afghanistan may regain its 
independence, but so that other countries directly affected by the 
invasion know that world opinion is behind them as they face the 
pressure of war. 
"The U.N. General Assembly has passed strong resolutions by 
overwhelming majorities, but such resolutions are unfortunately not 
self-executing. There is a need for active and imaginative diplomacy, 
to pin the responsibility for the present situations where it belongs, 
in Moscow, and to create the framework for a political solution 
against the day when such a thing may be possible. These were the 
reasons for the proposals put forward in June by the Ten members of 
the European Community proposals which roughly 70 countries have 
since supported. 
"In the years ahead, I expect European Political Cooperation 
to develop pragmaticallyo There will be no grand design, no 
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abolition of national foreign policies, no Euro-Foreign Office, no 
one Foreign Minister to the power of ten. But my nine colleagues 
and I will meet more often, agree more often, act together more 
often. We shall extend the range of subjects on which we concert. 
We shall launch more initiatives, and more of them will bring results. 
"When you ask us questions, our answers will be quicker and 
more helpful to you. Our cooperation in the Ten will not replace or 
compete with other groups in which most of the Members of the Commu-
nity are cooperating with other states: in particular, the role of 
NATO will not be impaired. But we in the Ten, soon to be Twelve, 
will become more and more what on our best days we are already: an 
economic and political grouping of substantial weight and consequence 
in the great events of the world. 
"I should not like to exaggerateo The influence which the Ten 
or Twelve can have, in a world dominated by superpowers and super 
weapons, will be limited. We cannot hope to set the world to rights 
or wave a wand over ancient international problems to produce an 
instant solution. Like other practitioners of the diplomatic art, 
we shall need patience and perseverence, and a willingness to tolerate 
second-best solutions when the best is not attainable. 
"I return to my starting point. Will this development of 
European Political Cooperation be in America's interests? Was General 
Eisenhower, in fact, right? 
" I believe that he was. It should be fruitful, not harmful, 
for Europe to operate in parallel to the United States. Europe has 
political and commercial ties with areas of the world with which 
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America is less familiar. In Africa, for example, there are leaders 
who are used to dealing with the Europeans and who feel at ease with 
us. The links tbat are being built up between the Ten and the 
Association of South-East Asian Nations (Asean) may in time produce 
something similar in another region of the world. For some situa-
tions it may be easier for Europe to develop a basis of common 
interest than it is for America as a superpower. European activity 
can give the West a greater flexibility and diversity in its inter-
national efforts. Not to deploy this flexibility with energy and 
imagination would be to waste our opportuniti~s. 
"I see anoth1r advantage to Amer.ica and to NATO. Without 
the growth of European Political Cooperation, some Europeans might 
come to feel that only the superpowers can play a role on the world 
stage nowadays. This could feed the mood of resignation, even fatal-
ism, which some have detected in the Old Continent. European 
Political Cooperation, by involving all of the Ten in activities 
directed to the world as a whole, can enhance both a sense of respon-
sibility and a sense of involvement. 
"General Eisenhower might be a little disappointed if he could 
read today the articles in your media and in ours about policy 
differences between our governments or about divergent trends in 
public opinion on the two sides of the Atlantic. America and Europe 
inevitably have a difference of perspectives. I find I have to 
adjust to it every time I fly the Atlantic. 
11Europeans, living next door to the Warsaw Pact and with 
memories of a war fought in their own farms and cities, inevitably 
have particular apprehensions about the possibility of nuclear war 
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in Europe. It is of course understandable -- indeed, I would say 
admirable -- that the United States, bearing the main brunt of 
Western security, should attach first priority to strengthening their 
defenses in the face of the unremitting Soviet military buildup. I 
hope you will find it no less understandable that Europeans should 
attach a very high priority to arms control negotiations which will 
make a real contribution to Western security. These two objectives 
are entirely complementary. It is essential for NATO to adopt --
and be seen by public opinion in member countries to be adopting 
a serious and thorough approach to arms control negotiations. 
Equally, we should not negotiate from a position of weakness. Indeed, 
there is little prospect of success in negotiations if we do so. I 
trust that on both sides of the Atlantic it will be widely accepted 
that a parallel approach on these lines is the sensible way forward. 
"The only way to deal with such differences is the tradi-
tional way of consultation. I am glad that this is given such a high 
priority over here. 
"Al Haig and I have been in close and frequent contact ever 
since the first day when he took office. We should be careful not 
to exaggerate our differences, least of all in public. We should not 
forget the close identity of interests and of ideals which link the 
United States to Britain and to the European Community as a whole. 
But we should not look for a total uniformity of view which, thank 
God, can never exist on this side of the Iron Curtain. To say more 
on this theme would only be to echo the words of your Secretary of 
State's speech in Berlin ten days ago. 
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"As Al Haig reminded us on that occasion, Western society is 
based on democracy and pluralism. There are ways in which this can 
seem to make us weaker than the monolithic regimes. We cannot spend 
money without it being voted. We cannot pass laws without consult-
ing our Parliaments. We cannot take decisions without regard to our 
public opinion. We cannot even come to power without being elected. 
"But in reality this pluralism is our strength. It gives us 
flexibility, creativity, variety, imagination, vigor. An alliance 
of equals, all contributing to policy, is infinitely stronger than 
any system on the solar model. The policies of Western Governments 
have greater weight precisely because they must command the support 
of public opinion. 
"In the 80s, we must exploit these strengths. The fundamental 
object! ves and beliefs of Europe and America will remain the same.' 
We can afford diversity over methodso There is a role for the Euro-
pean Ten, a role for NATO, a role for the wider family of indus-
trialized democracies. When there are differences within and among 
these groups, we must consult. When there seem to be no differences, 
we must consult just the same otherwise differences will develop. 
"There is strength in diversity, and also in unity. What I 
have been suggesting is diversity without dispute in our methods, 
unity without uniformity in our policies, and identity in our aims 
and our ideals. 
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